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I. Executive Summary
The Office of the State Inspector General (SIG) initiated this review predicated on a credible complaint alleging 
substantial health and safety deficiencies in the care of a resident placed in a Community Residential Care 
Facility (CRCF), which was licensed and regulated by the Department of Health and Environmental Control 
(DHEC).  CRCF facilities, commonly known as “assisted living,” provide housing, food, and care to individuals 
who are unable to live independently, but do not need skilled nursing care.  The CRCF population varied greatly 
depending on several factors, principally the facilities’ revenue source from private pay (as high as 
$5,000/month) or Medicaid ($1,351/month), as well as size ranging from four beds to 184.  Initial investigation 
revealed this complaint may be just a symptom of systemic health and safety deficiencies throughout DHEC’s 
CRCF Program, which regulates 471 CRCFs serving approximately 17,000 vulnerable clients, primarily the 
elderly and disabled.   
DHEC subject matter experts candidly identified a group of CRCFs with systemic deficiencies, as did partners 
in sister State agencies and advocacy groups.  They only differed on the breadth of the systemic deficiencies 
among the 471 CRCFs.  A federally funded non-profit, Protection & Advocacy for People with Disabilities, Inc. 
(P&A), produced a 2013 report citing, “Thousands of poor South Carolinians with disabilities continue to live 
in grossly inadequate conditions in community residential care facilities across the state…The report’s findings 
revealed continued lack of oversight of facilities that are dirty, provide inadequate food, do not administer 
medications correctly, violate residents’ rights, and do not provide protection from potential harm (see link at  http://
pandasc.org/2013/12/new-report/  ).” Witnesses often defaulted assessing CRCFs based on if they would place a relative 
in a CRCF, which tended to skew assessments more negative than strictly applying the state law.     
Perhaps the best evidence of the scope of the problem came from DHEC’s CRCF inspectors.  Eleven inspectors 
rated CRCFs each had previously inspected with the following results:  4% unsatisfactory living conditions; 6% 
mixed ratings of unsatisfactory or “at risk” barely able to maintain satisfactory conditions; 10% “at risk” barely 
able to maintain satisfactory conditions; 70% satisfactory living conditions; and 10% not rated.  Of interest, new 
inspectors rated CRCFs unsatisfactory at a higher frequency (17%), while senior inspectors were less critical 
with unsatisfactory ratings (6%).  The senior inspectors seemed to factor in the reality many clients in these “at 
risk” facilities would not have other options if their CRCF was closed given the finite number of CRCF 
Medicaid beds in a community.  Subsequent to the SIG’s field work, DHEC initiated an action plan identifying 
25 (5.3%) chronically deficient CRCFs requiring heighted inspections and aggressive remediation of 
deficiencies.   
The review concluded the risk of unsatisfactory living conditions was not systemic throughout all 471 CRCFs, 
but rather was a subset tending to have smaller bed capacity and clients’ reliance on a Medicaid supplement.  
This unaddressed CRCF population was not due to a lack of DHEC inspections and corresponding reports.  
Rather, it was due to DHEC’s ineffective process of using these inspection reports to drive positive change, or, 
as a last resort, suspend or close a recalcitrant CRCF unwilling or incapable of providing satisfactory living 
conditions.  This was a process problem and not a people problem.  Personnel from involved State agencies and 
advocacy groups exhibited the passion taxpayers would and should expect.   
During a 15 month period in 2014-2015, DHEC cited 465 licensed CRCFs with 8,669 inspection violations: 
4,205 (49%) Class I Violations (imminent danger to the health, safety, or well-being of the resident); 2,766
(32%) Class II Violations (a negative impact on the health, safety, or well-being of the resident); and 1,698
(19%) Class III Violations (lesser impact citations).  Despite the volume and seriousness of the citations, it took a 
protracted effort measured in many years, or worse, to successfully address a recalcitrant CRCF unwilling or 
unable to resolve Class I violations.   
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The reason for this elongated process was DHEC’s inspections only itemized violations geared towards a CRCF 
developing its own remediation plan which would be re-inspected within 12 months, sometimes sooner if CRCF 
Program Management personally engages an under-performing CRCF.  It generally took multiple inspections 
with excessive violations for DHEC Program Managers to recommend a CRCF to DHEC’s enforcement 
mechanism for formal action.  Formal action started with another agreement, known as a Consent Order, where 
the CRCF agreed to take action on the same items it previously failed to remedy.  The CRCF generally paid a 
small percent of its fine (20%) and the Consent Order was completed within a year seemingly based on final 
payment and 12 months passing rather than confirmation the violations had been remedied.  Then, a recalcitrant 
CRCF’s very next inspection resumed the pattern of repeat violations.  Yet, throughout this multi-year 
process having a great likelihood of never culminating, the clients of the recalcitrant CRCFs continued to 
live in unsatisfactory living conditions (SIG emphasis).     
Further complicating addressing recalcitrant CRCFs were the overlapping interests from five other State 
agencies, some with a degree of oversight responsibilities.  These agencies clearly saw their role as subordinate 
to DHEC, yet these other agencies’ involvement had a diluting effect of DHEC’s clear ownership of addressing 
unsatisfactory CRCFs.  Responsibility needs to be singularly focused with DHEC to address recalcitrant 
CRCFs, and the other agencies need to be integrated into an overall strategy without clouding DHEC’s 
accountability for results.   
The direction for improvement is sharpening DHEC’s audit process to a risk based model to target resources on 
“high risk” CRCFs to preferably support them to provide satisfactory living conditions or develop evidence to 
allow adjudicators to take swift action.  The risk based audit process starts with the extra step during annual 
inspections “to make the call” on whether the aggregate inspection violations creates a “high risk” CRCF with a 
“high risk” of operating with unsatisfactory living conditions.  The audit process then effectively separates these 
potential high risk facilities needing high intensity intervention from those CRCFs with trustworthy 
management and the capacity to remedy inspection violations in the ordinary course of business.  Being 
identified by a single inspection as “high risk” should not be determinative as having unsatisfactory living 
conditions, but rather places this CRCF in a high risk pool managed by senior, experienced inspectors.  These 
senior inspectors re-inspect the CRCF for an expert determination if, and to what extent, the CRCF operates in 
an overall unsatisfactory living conditions.  Then, these senior inspectors, who are capable of a quality root 
cause analysis, establish a DHEC imposed remediation plan, rather than CRCF self-determined plan.  Then, set 
realistic deadlines measured in days, weeks, or a few months, rather than years or worse.   
This audit approach will confront high risk CRCFs in an expedited timeframe with a consistent, objective, and 
fair intervention geared towards support.  The CRCF owner will have the simple choice of conforming to 
satisfactory standards or face with certainty a series of additional follow-up inspections in a compressed time 
frame given the existing risk to vulnerable clients.  This risk based audit approach follows the basic 
management tenant that the certainty of consequences prevents offenses.  
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II. Background
A. Predicate
This review was predicated on a credible complaint alleging substantial health and safety deficiencies in the 
care of a resident placed in a Community Residential Care Facility (CRCF) in Kershaw County, South Carolina, 
which was licensed and regulated by the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC).  Initial 
investigation with subject matter experts, non-profit advocacy groups, and CRCF inspection reports revealed 
this single incident might be a symptom of systemic health and safety deficiencies throughout DHEC’s CRCF 
Program, which regulates 471 CRCFs with the approximately 17,000 vulnerable clients, primarily elderly and 
disabled.   
B. Scope & Objectives
This review’s scope and objectives were: 
 Assess the risk of a vulnerable population of elderly and disabled citizens residing in CRCFs living in
unsatisfactory health and safety conditions;
 Evaluate DHEC’s CRCF Program inspection process capabilities to identify and address CRCFs with
unsatisfactory health and safety living conditions;
 Recommend opportunities to improve the CRCF Program.
Reviews by the SIG are conducted in accordance with professional standards set forth by the Association of 
Inspector General, often referred to as the “Green Book.” 
C. CRCF Program Description
DHEC licensed and monitored 471 CRCFs with a total of 17,448 beds across the state. The licensed bed 
capacity represented the maximum number of residents CRCFs may serve in accordance with their licenses. 
CRCF facilities provided housing, food, and care to individuals who were unable to live independently, but who 
did not need skilled nursing care.  The core services provided include, but are not limited to: 
 Three meals a day with snacks;
 Assistance with eating, bathing, dressing, toileting and walking;
 Medication assistance;
 Housekeeping services;
 24 hours, seven days a week staffing; and
 Transportation to medical appointments.
As a CRCF resident, an individual has the right to be treated with dignity and respect, to have freedom of choice 
and a physical environment that is safe, secure, sanitary and well-maintained in accordance with DHEC’s 
CRCF Standards (R.61-84; R.61-25) and the Bill of Rights for Residents of Long-Term Care Facilities 
(Appendix B).     
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There were a wide variety of CRCFs to meet the needs of a diversified population.  CRCFs ranged in size from 
four beds to 184 licensed beds as described in the following table: 
Category # of Beds per Facility # of Facilities Total # of Beds 
Mom & Pop 4-9 135    (29%)  918     (5%) 
Small 10-49 182    (39%) 4,257    (24%) 
Medium 50-99 119    (25%)        8,081    (47%) 
Large 100-184    35      (7%) 4,192     (24%) 
Total n/a   471 (100%)      17,448   (100%) 
CRCFs were also differentiated by their source of revenue.  Private pay could be as high as $5,000 per month, 
while Medicaid supplemental was $1,351 per month.  Clients using Medicaid supplemental first applied their 
monthly social security income/disability check to the fixed $1,351 CRCF fee, and then Medicaid supplements 
paid the difference direct to the CRCF.  CRCFs’ revenue streams ranged on the spectrum from completely 
private pay to completely Medicaid supplemental, with many facilities having a combination of the two revenue 
sources.     
III. Data sources to Assess the CRCF Program
The SIG collected data from multiple optics to understand the risk of a vulnerable population of elderly and 
disabled citizens residing in unsatisfactory living conditions in CRCFs, as well as the CRCF Program’s 
inspection process capabilities to identify and address CRCFs with unsatisfactory living conditions.  Data 
included subject matter experts, CRCF Program inspection reports, other agency reports, CRCF administrators, 
and CRCF inspectors on the “front line.”   
A. Protection and Advocacy for People with Disabilities, Inc.
Established in 1977, Protection and Advocacy for People with Disabilities, Inc. (P&A) was mandated by state 
and federal law to protect the legal, civil, and human rights of people with disabilities in South Carolina.   P&A 
had successfully conducted over 1,322 unannounced CRCF inspections.  These inspections were resident 
focused addressing resident’s access to clothing and hygiene, adaptive equipment, medical care/medications, 
transportation, and personal needs allowance.  In addition, the inspections also examined facilities for general 
fire and safety hazards, maintenance, housekeeping, and furnishings.   
In 2009, P&A issued a report titled, “No Place to Call Home,” which was followed up in 2013 with a second 
report titled, “Still No Place to Call Home (see link at http://pandasc.org/2013/12/new-report/  ).”  The report stated,
“Thousands of poor South Carolinians with disabilities continue to live in grossly inadequate conditions in 
community residential care facilities (CRCFs) across the state…The report’s findings reveal continued lack of 
oversight of facilities that are dirty, provide inadequate food, do not administer medications correctly, violate 
residents’ rights, and do not provide protection from potential harm.” 
P&A noted while many CRCF owners are committed to operating facilities providing a good quality of care, the 
lack of effective oversight puts all residents of CRCFs at risk of harm.  P&A's two reports identified a lack of 
progress in improving conditions in CRCFs.  The most recent report outlined five recommendations to improve 
protection for people with disabilities who live in CRCFs statewide, with emphasis on more enforcement 
options against frequently cited facilities and administrators.  The recommendations conveyed, "The state and 
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individual residents are paying for services that do not meet the standard of care established by regulation to 
ensure safety and accountability in these facilities.” 
DHEC actively supported and commended P&A’s work.  However, DHEC pointed out P&A findings do not 
necessarily translate to violations of the laws administered by DHEC nor necessarily serve as bases for 
enforcement actions against a CRCF.  DHEC proffered P&A reviews are at a different angle than its inspections 
driven by criteria established by state law.   
B. DHEC Inspection Violations for Period 7/1/2014 through 9/25/2015
DHEC’s annual inspections of CRCFs used four checklists.  These checklists set forth 131 requirements 
examined during the inspection (see Appendix C).  Further, a single requirement could be violated multiple 
times, such as multiple patient files failing to conduct a written assessment within 72 hours of admission.   
During the period of 7/1/2014 – 9/25/2015, DHEC cited 465 licensed CRCFs inspected for 8,669 violations as 
follows:   
 4,205 (49%) Class I Violations - imminent danger to the health, safety, or well-being of the resident
 2,766 (32%)  Class II Violations - negative impact on the health, safety, or well-being of the resident
 1,698 (19%)  Class III Violations - lesser impact citations
One CRCF had more than 100 violations during this period.  An additional twenty-one CRCFs had between 50-
100 violations totaling 1,407 violations during this period with numerous repeated violations.   
The 4,205 Class I Violations were categorized as follows: 
 1,682 (40%)    Staff/Training
 1,658 (40%)    Resident Care/Medications
 454    (10%)    Fire & Life Safety
 411    (10%)    Housekeeping
C. State Fire Marshal Inspection Violations for Period 11/12/2012 through 11/12/2015
During the period 11/12/2012 – 11/12/2015, the State Fire Marshal inspected 431 CRCFs and cited 2,710 
violations as follows:   
 2,039 (75%) Class I Violations - imminent danger to the health, safety, or well-being of the resident
 531    (23%) Class II Violations - negative impact on the health, safety, or well-being of the resident
 40        (2%) Class III Violations - lesser impact citations 
One CRCF had 40 violations during this period.  An additional ten CRCFs had between 20 - 40 violations 
totaling 275 violations during this period with numerous repeated violations. 
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D. Enforcement Actions for the Period 1/1/2003 through 6/30/2015
The core problem raised by interviewees, both inside DHEC and external partners, was DHEC’s lack of timely 
enforcement capabilities of CRCFs recalcitrantly failing to seriously address their unsatisfactory living 
conditions for clients.  DHEC has an enforcement program with specific protocols (see Appendix D).  This 
program resulted in the following enforcement actions during the period of 2003 through June 2015:   
Enforcement Action  Frequency 
License Revoked  9 
License Suspended         31# 
Admissions Suspended  3 
Monetary Penalty Letters 25@ 
DHEC Consent Orders         120@ 
Administrative Orders  3 
Facility Denied a License  2 
     Total          193 
@  $1,130,511 fines (20% estimated actual payments). 
#  license suspended based upon facilities' failure to comply with structural  
 standards after undergoing a change of ownership after July 27, 2001.  
A review of the enforcements over the past 13 years averaged 15 enforcements/year.  The specific annual 
enforcements for this time period were:     
To better understand the issue of timely enforcement capabilities, the SIG identified five currently operating 
CRCFs reported by witnesses and supported by DHEC inspection reports as having overall unsatisfactory living 
conditions for many years (see Appendix E).  These five CRCFs’ inspection and enforcement actions since 
2010 were chronologically examined yielding the following results:  
 CRCF #1:  Four inspection reports beginning on 5/20/2011 totaled 115 violations (41 Class I) of which
88 were repeat violations.  This culminated in a 2/5/2013 Consent Order.  Six inspections over the next
17 months yielded 120 violations (66 Class I) of which 54 were repeat violations, yet inexplicably
DHEC considered the pending Consent Order satisfied with the final fine payment on 7/7/2014.  Over
the next 15 months, with the most recent being 10/2/2015, three inspections yielded 55 violations (29
Class I) and 19 repeat violations.
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 CRCF #2:  Four inspection reports beginning on 11/11/2010 totaled 76 violations (50 Class I) of which
25 were repeat violations.  This culminated in an 8/7/2012 Consent Order.  Two inspections over the
next year yielded 24 violations (17 Class I) and 10 repeat violations.  On 8/13/2013, DHEC assessed a
$500 fine for non-compliance with pending Consent Order.  The next inspection on 10/24/2013 yielded
11 violations (8 Class I) and 3 repeat violations, yet inexplicably DHEC considered the pending Consent
Order satisfied with the final payment on 12/12/2013.  Five subsequent inspections, with the most recent
being 10/23/2015, yielded 56 violations (19 Class I) and 24 repeat violations.
 CRCF #3:  Four inspection reports beginning on 5/24/2012 totaled 58 violations (31 Class I) of which
49 were repeat violations.  On 7/23/2014, DHEC executed a Consent Order that assessed a $5,000 fine
based on repeated violations.  Two inspections over the next year yielded 50 violations (35 Class I) and
17 repeat violations, yet inexplicably DHEC considered the pending Consent Order satisfied with the
final payment on 7/24/2015.  It was noted that during 10 months, the CRCF was operated by an
administrator with an expired license.
 CRCF #4:  Five inspection reports beginning on 5/11/2012 totaled 35 violations (24 Class I) of which
11 were repeat violations.  This culminated in a 5/1/2014 Consent Order imposing a $10,000 fine.  Over
the next 18 months five inspections yielded 150 violations (136 Class I) and 93 repeat violations.  On
2/4/2015, DHEC assessed a Call-in Penalty of $8,800 for repeated violations and non-compliance with
the pending Consent Order.  DHEC considered the pending Consent Order satisfied with the final
payment of the $10,000 fine. In addition, DHEC executed an Administrative Order on 4/24/2014 to the
CRCF Owner imposing a $5,000 fine for operating an unlicensed facility which has not been paid.
 CRCF #5:  Two inspection reports beginning on 1/29/2010 totaled 24 violations of which 24 were Class
I violations.  This culminated in a 2/5/2013 Consent Order imposing a $4,200 fine.  On 5/18/2011,
DHEC considered the pending Consent Order satisfied with receipt of the final payment.  Six
inspections over the next 19 months yielded 124 violations (51 Class I) and 53 were repeat violations.
On 7/23/2014, DHEC executed another Consent Order that assessed a $20,000 fine based on violations
volume and repeated violations.  The next three inspections yielded 53 violations (27 Class I) and 19
repeat violations, yet inexplicably DHEC considered the pending Consent Order satisfied with the final
payment on 9/24/2015.
Subject matter experts identified all five of these CRCFs as having systemic and unresolved unsatisfactory 
living conditions.  Yet, despite this common knowledge supported by years and years of inspection reports, 
vulnerable elderly and disabled clients continued to live in unsatisfactory living conditions while oversight 
seemingly traded paper with recalcitrant CRCFs owners/administrator (SIG emphasis).   
Many witnesses cited the Peachtree Manor CRCF as an example of this systemic problem.  Clients were so at 
risk while DHEC’s enforcement actions eked along, another oversight agency sent personnel to check on clients 
every week during the nearly two year process of administratively closing this facility.  The enforcement 
actions surrounding Peachtree Manor began in 2006 and the Administrative Law Court (ALC) Order upholding 
DHEC's revocation of Peachtree's license occurred in 2008. Two contemporaneous news articles of this incident 
vividly illustrated conditions for clients at Peachtree Manor and captured the State’s bureaucratic posture in its 
inability to effectively address a recalcitrant CRCF (see Appendix A).   
A more recent example cited by witnesses was the Robin’s CRCF.  Robin’s was inspected on 10 occasions by 
DHEC during the period of 7/20/2011 – 5/21/2013, cited for over 80 violations that included numerous Class I 
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Violations and repeat violations.  In September 2013, DHEC initiated enforcement conferences with Robins, 
which failed to attend on multiple scheduled meetings.  Based on Robin’s disengagement with DHEC’s 
regulatory authority, this ultimately led to a May 2014 license revocation.  However, Robins filed a request for 
a contested case hearing with the ALC.  The ALC upheld DHEC’s license revocation, but it was not final until 
January 11, 2016, all the while these clients had to endure the ongoing poor treatment and unsatisfactory living 
conditions for well over two years from DHEC’s initial attempted enforcement action.  Astonishingly, although 
Robin’s CRCF license has been revoked, the Robin’s Administrator is still licensed by LLR to operate another 
CRCF (see link for ALC order http://oig.sc.gov/Documents/Robins_CRCF_Administrative_Law_Court_Order.pdf ).     
E. CRCF Program Inspector’s  Controlled Self-Assessment
Data from every source described the CRCF Program as having systemic problems with CRCFs operating with 
unsatisfactory health and safety conditions.  To better understand this risk described in a variety of broad brush 
manners, the SIG conducted a controlled self-assessment with the CRCF Program Inspectors.     
Eleven inspectors rated the CRCFs each had previously inspected with the following results:  a 4% 
unsatisfactory living conditions; 6% mixed ratings of unsatisfactory or “at risk” barely able to maintain 
satisfactory conditions; 10% “at risk” barely able to maintain satisfactory conditions; 70% satisfactory living 
conditions; and 10% not rated.  Of interest, new inspectors rated CRCFs unsatisfactory at a higher frequency 
(17%), while senior inspectors were less critical with unsatisfactory ratings (6%).  The senior inspectors seem to 
factor in the reality many clients in these “at risk” facilities would not have other options if their CRCF was 
closed given the finite number of CRCF Medicaid beds in a community.   
Ten percent of the CRCFs were rated unsatisfactory by at least one inspector.  This 10% of CRCFs were cited 
with 24% of the inspection violations over the prior 15 month period, and were almost all dependent upon 
Medicaid supplemental clients.   
Discussion of the above quantitative results with Program Inspectors surfaced a number of unique consensus 
qualitative observations: 
 The driver in CRCFs chronically operating with unsatisfactory living conditions was its
owner/administrator commitment to meet standards.  Operating CRCFs reliant on clients using the
maximum Medicaid supplement ($1,351/month) created a thin profit margin, particularly with small
CRCFs where the problem was most prevalent.  If the owner/administrator’s commitment to standards
was secondary to the profit motive, cutting corners on standards became the norm to save costs and
reciprocally increase profits.  Not one inspector was aware of a highly motivated owner/administrator
operating a CRCF with unsatisfactory living conditions.
 A close second factor was poor financial management capabilities.  It appeared due to the thin profit
margin, an unplanned or unexpected large expense or revenue loss (i.e., empty beds) had the potential
to completely disrupt CRCF operations due to a lack of working capital.  Absent financial planning,
budgeting, and practical cost containment, client’s services quickly become compromised by the shear
lack of money requiring corner cutting of standards.
 The recalcitrant CRCF owners knew DHEC had weak enforcement capabilities, so they did not fear
getting caught cutting corners or level of care.  If caught by an inspection, these CRCFs knew they
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could outlast the annoyances of the process’s paper chase without substantive change or negative 
consequences.   
 The most important attribute for a successful CRCF was a highly motivated and engaged administrator
who was on-site more than expected to ensure the 24/7 staff is properly trained and working
effectively.  When the administrator disengages, the 24/7 staff slip as well and living standards erode.
Subsequent to the SIG’s field work, DHEC initiated an action plan identifying 25 (5.3%) chronically deficient 
CRCFs requiring heighted inspections and aggressive remediation of deficiencies.   
IV. Site Visits to “Mom & Pop” CRCFs
Mom & Pop CRCFs (9 beds or less) have the thinnest profit margin and were considered the highest risk CRCF.  
The SIG, based on subject matter expert input, selected and assessed two Mom & Pop CRCFs considered 
having unsatisfactory living conditions and one considered to have exceptional living conditions. 
A. Unsatisfactory Living Conditions
Both facilities were single family dwellings located in moderate to low income neighborhoods.  The facilities 
had four and five clients, respectively, representing only a 60-70% occupancy rate creating an immediate 
financial strain due to these facilities disproportionally high fixed overhead burdens.  The most obvious 
deficiency was each facility, likely based on aforementioned financial strain, appeared to rely on one staff 
member to live at the facility to meet the clients’ needs, as opposed to the State requirement staff must be awake 
24 hours a day.  Essentially, these facilities relied on one person to work all waking hours and be available to be 
awakened at night if there was an emergency.  The lack of a robust staff required by State law placed the CRCF 
in a nearly impossible position of keeping up with daily requirements and recurring functions, let alone the 
predictable crises from clients.   
The client’s rooms were sparse, common areas equally sparse, and poorly heated.  In one facility, the clients all 
were wearing winter hats and coats watching TV; the facility seemed as cold inside as the temperature was 
outside.  The clients seemed reasonably situated, except for a new client who had a long list of complaints from 
medicines, food, and doctor transportation.  At one of the facilities, the clients indicated they received cereal for 
breakfast and sandwiches for lunch/dinner.  One facility smelled of urine, had rooms seemingly belonging to a 
hoarder, and the team was greeted with a large dead cockroach in the foyer upon entry.  
An incident illustrating one of the CRCF administrator's recalcitrant attitude occurred when the accompanying 
DHEC inspector requested to see the clients’ records.  The administrator rustled some papers on a table only to 
advise the records were locked in the office and the administrator could not locate the key.  The DHEC 
inspector advised this same administrator used that exact same stalling technique on a prior inspection.   
B. Satisfactory Living Conditions
The difference was immediately noticeable from the maintenance of the exterior and the cleanliness of the 
interior.  The clients seemed much more alert and engaging, and clearly viewed this facility as a home.  The 
attention to detail from food menus, snacks, client engagement, and sanitation was dramatically ahead of the 
unsuccessful facilities.  The clients seemed well cared for, clean, and they commented the meals were good.   
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The atmosphere was much more conducive to the client’s physical and mental well-being.  The facility was at 
authorized capacity maximizing revenue to operate a high fixed overhead operation.   
This CRCF’s administrator was highly experienced and was able to provide a compelling analysis that the 
“Mom & Pop” CRCFs have a razor thin profit margin if operated to state standards by a skilled and motivated 
administrator.  This CRCF administrator assessed CRCFs having unsatisfactory living conditions as much 
higher than the controlled self-assessment estimate of 4-10%.  This administrator rated the motivation of a 
CRCF administrator to serve clients and financial skills as the two most important ingredients for a successful 
operation.  This CRCF administrator acknowledged that the recalcitrant CRCFs know DHEC’s enforcement 
was not effective, which only enabled this subgroup not to change.    
The clients at the unsatisfactory CRCFs seemed not to be mistreated in the traditional sense.  They were more 
“untreated” which was a form of abuse.  The purpose of CRCFs was assisted living in a satisfactory living 
condition, both physically and emotionally.  The successful CRCF just did what it was designed to do – provide 
assisted living, while the unsatisfactory CRCFs seemed more akin to a boarding house.   
V. Other State Agencies Involved in the CRCF Program
All five other State agencies with equities in the CRCF Program recognized the inability to address recalcitrant 
CRCFs providing unsatisfactory living conditions.  These five were:  SC Department of Labor, Licensing & 
Regulation (LLR); SC Department of Health & Human Services (SCDHHS); SC Department of Mental Health 
(DMH); SC Department of Social Services (DSS); and the Lieutenant Governor’s Office on Aging.  These 
agencies’ unique roles pertain to oversight, funding, and/or client services/placements.     
As with most of State government, employees were collegial and attempted to coordinate in good faith.  Each 
attempted to coordinate or forward relevant information to each other, using DHEC as the central location.  
Several agencies proffered they do a level of on-site reviews resulting, again, in reports being sent to other 
partners, primarily DHEC.  However, this collegiality and attempted teamwork over CRCFs had only dimmed 
an individual agency to “grab the ball” and solve the problem of addressing recalcitrant CRCFs providing 
unsatisfactory living conditions.  Each agency had unique roles or functions, but each was clearly subordinate in 
its authority and capability to DHEC in driving needed change in recalcitrant CRCFs.     
A. SC Board of Long Term Health Care Administrators, LLR
SC Long Term Health Care Administrators Board (LTHC Board) under the auspices of LLR, licensed the 
CRCF Administrators, managed continuing educational requirements, and investigated/adjudicated professional 
misconduct complaints.  LLR’s FY2014 – FY2015 Annual Report indicated there were 579 licensed CRCF 
Administrators; 9 Provisional Licensed CRCF Administrators; and 143 dually licensed CRCF/Nursing Home 
Administrators.   
For many disciplinary proceedings, the LTHC Board primarily relied on DHEC inspections and Consent Orders 
for CRCFs as the primary source of data.  The LTHC disciplinary actions tended to follow DHEC’s lead when 
sanctioning CRCF administrators.  In the past nine years (2007-2015), the LTHC Board issued 78 sanctions for 
CRCF Administrators, which included four license revocations; eight license suspensions; five sanctioned for 
operating with an expired license; three for operating an unlicensed facility; 13 voluntarily relinquished their 
licenses; and 45 were misconduct/non-compliance with applicable state regulations.  Sanctions associated with 
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DHEC inspection reports of substantial non-compliance generally included a one year suspension which was 
immediately stayed, followed by a one year probationary status subject to specific conditions.  It appeared the 
probationary status was lifted, much like DHEC’s probationary discipline, without independent assurance the 
substantial non-compliance was remedied.  A subject matter expert advised it has been discussed periodically 
over the past 10 years of transferring the CRCF Administrator’s licensing function to DHEC to consolidate the 
authority, responsibility, and accountability for the State to effectively monitor and regulate CRCFs and the 
administrators.   
B. South Carolina Department of Mental Health
The South Carolina Department of Mental Health (DMH) assisted patients with mental illness in securing 
appropriate local housing.  The DMH implemented a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with 100 CRCFs 
outlining the responsibilities of the community mental health centers and the community residential care 
facilities in providing care and treatment to patient in CRCFs.  The majority of the (82%) of CRCF patients 
served had a diagnosis of a severe and persistent mental illness.  DMH did periodic on-site visits, as well as paid 
P&A $75,000/year to conduct 72 CRCF inspections annually.  
C. Optional State Supplementation (OSS) Program, SCDHHS
The SCDHHS provided financial supplementation to Social Security Disability Insurance/ Supplemental 
Security Income (SSDI/SSI) beneficiaries through Optional State Supplementation (OSS), a state-funded 
program.  Qualifying SSDI/SSI beneficiaries used their monthly benefit check to pay towards a fixed monthly 
rate of $1,351 by CRCFs and the OSS paid the difference ($600-$800/month) direct to the CRCF.  Although the 
OSS had the authority to audit CRCFs, as well as potential future program assurance plans, it currently deferred 
to DHEC.  Approximately 350 CRCFs (75%) participated in the OSS Program.  As an aside, OSS contributed 
$25,000 to DMH to pay P&A $75,000/year to fund its inspection efforts. 
During interview, the OSS Program advised many CRCFs were missing opportunities to increase OSS funding 
by an additional $200/month under the Optional Supplemental Care of Assisted Living Participants (OSCAP) 
Program.  The OSCAP service provided additional reimbursement to facilities to provide assistance with 
personal care for residents who met certain medical criteria.  OSS was attempting to increase its communication 
to CRCF administrators to address this funding issue.  OSS did periodic on-site reviews of the CRCFs that 
received OSCAP funding. 
D. South Carolina Department of Social Services
The South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) provided social services to eligible adults through 
direct provision of services by DSS staff and through referrals to other social service agencies for services.  
DSS also made direct placements of its clients into CRCFs.  Adult Protective Services had a role in 
investigating individuals who are 18 or older and were victims of actual or potential abuse, neglect or 
exploitation, as well as a role in relocating clients from closed CRCFs.   
E. State Long Term Care Ombudsman, Lieutenant Governor’s Office on Aging
The South Carolina Long Term Care Ombudsman Program (LTCO) was governed by the federal Older 
Americans Act and by the South Carolina Omnibus Adult Protection Act.  The LTCO administered the 
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statewide program through ten regional offices.  The LTCO investigated complaints about the abuse, neglect 
and exploitation of residents in CRCFs.  The LTCO worked with the residents, facility staff and the resident’s 
family or legal representative to resolve problems and concerns about the quality of care and services residents 
received and advocated for public policy initiatives affecting long-term care.  During calendar year 2015, LTCO 
investigated 3,683 Quality of Care Complaints at CRCFs. 
VI. Direction for Improvement:  Risk Based Inspections
Currently, absent a crisis, such as no staff or no medicine at a CRCF during an inspection, DHEC has no 
capability to timely address CRCFs operating in unsatisfactory living conditions.  DHEC can only provide the 
inspection report to the CRCF, who then were required to self-report a corrective action plan in 15 days.  This 
correction plan will not be followed-up by DHEC until the next annual inspection or potentially in 6-7 months if 
DHEC management makes a discretionary decision to prioritize an under-performing CRCF.  After a second 
inspection with repeat non-compliance of a substantial nature, DHEC has the option to start a several month 
process of a Consent Order where the CRCF voluntarily agrees to remedy inspection items it has previously 
agreed to do but failed.  This Consent Order then may be forwarded to LLR who may sanction the CRCF 
administrator, but the sanction is normally a fine/probation essentially following DHECs lead in its sanctions.  
This pattern then starts over with the only possible rare exception of a CRCF being recommended for an 
Administrative Order from DHEC, which then can be appealed to the Administrative Court.  As evidenced by 
this reviews’ data with particular attention of tracking this process in five egregious, unsatisfactory CRCFs, this 
enforcement paper cycle has likely no end while clients continue to live in unsatisfactory living conditions. (see 
Appendix E).   
Why?  The audit and adjudication process is designed to support the estimated 90% of CRCFs whose 
management acts in good faith to resolve inspection findings to maintain a healthy living condition for their 
clients.  This methodical escalating administrative oversight system may be just fine for many types of non-
compliance not directly causing unsatisfactory living conditions.  However, this process is inconsistent with 
clients living in unsatisfactory living conditions while the remedial administrative process grinds on with a 
low likelihood of really addressing a recalcitrant non-compliant CRCF.  This 4-10% of CRCFs with patterns of 
systemic non-compliance resulting in persistent unsatisfactory living conditions is the problem, which is 
ineffectively addressed by the current inspection/enforcement/adjudication process.   
The direction for improvement is to develop a sound, defensible, and simple risk based audit approach to clearly 
identify a “high risk” CRCF with a “high risk” of unsatisfactory living conditions by “making the call” during a 
general inspection.  The DHEC 131 item inspection checklists must be distilled into a single decision, which 
then can justify rigorous follow-up and support to “high risk” CRCFs, while the residual estimated 90% of 
CRCFs with trustworthy management and the capacity to remedy inspection violations can continue in the 
current system remedying violations in the ordinary course of business.   
Being identified by a single inspection as “high risk” is not determinative as having unsatisfactory living 
conditions, but rather places this CRCF in a high risk pool managed by senior, experienced inspectors.  These 
senior inspectors re-inspect the CRCF for an expert determination if, and to what extent, the CRCF operates in 
an overall unsatisfactory living conditions.  Then, these senior inspectors will be capable of a quality root cause 
analysis establishing a DHEC imposed remediation plan, rather than a CRCF self-determined plan.  Then, set 
realistic deadlines measured in days, weeks, or a few months, rather than years, or worse, to address this 
unacceptable risk.   
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This audit approach will confront high risk CRCFs in an expedited timeframe with a consistent, objective, and 
fair intervention geared towards support.  The CRCF owner will have the simple choice of conforming to 
satisfactory standards or face with certainty a series of additional follow-up inspections in a compressed time 
frame given the existing risk to vulnerable clients.  If follow-up inspections are failed, this will provide ample 
evidence to then allow adjudicators to take swift action.  Additionally, when provided compelling evidence, 
adjudicator’s swift action to protect clients should be concurrent with, not at the conclusion of, CRCF 
administrative due process appeals.  This risk based audit approach follows the basic management tenant that 
the certainty of consequences prevents offenses.   
Adjusting the audit process to establish certainty of consequences, along with subject matter experts giving a 
CRCF every opportunity to succeed, will have the positive management effect on these “high risk” CRCFs of 
solving their problems in advance of inspections.  Whatever audit resources required to support and follow-up 
on the “high risk” pool will be more than offset by avoiding all the inefficient and ineffective motion operating 
the current enforcement process.  This provides assurance, in the least intrusive manner,  DHEC is meeting its 
#1 CRCF strategic objective  – keeping clients safe and secure in satisfactory living conditions, as well as 
returning these “high risk” CRCFs to satisfactory living conditions as quick as possible. 
No one wants to regulate a CRCF out of business.  On the contrary, regulatory inspections actually promote 
CRCF improvement.  However, intense regulation of a CRCF that cannot solve unsatisfactory living conditions 
for clients should receive no sympathy and the State needs to demonstrate resolve through persistent follow-up 
to solve the situation. 
From a long-term perspective, it is time to recognize smaller CRCFs have the lowest revenues, highest 
overhead, clients most in need of services, and the clients most vulnerable.  All this adds up to these smaller 
CRCFs having the highest risk of not only meeting requirements but also going out of business due to pure 
economics.  Data developed from DHEC’s addressing this “high risk” CRCF pool should be used to help OSS, 
SCDHHS, determine if its monthly support should be raised, at least for the small CRCFs, because beds lost in 
these facilities found in low income communities may not be replaceable. The most credible subject matter 
expert commented, ‘if it (CRCF) is not a labor of love, it will enter the realm of poor care due to the 
economics.’ 
VII. Findings & Recommendations
Finding #1:  The CRCF Program’s audit and enforcement process inadequately addressed CRCFs with 
systemic, reoccurring violations causing a risk of imminent danger to clients resulting in unsatisfactory living 
conditions. 
Recommendation #1a:  The CRCF Program, DHEC, should consider maturing its audit program to a 
risk based approach to increase focus on “high risk” CRCFs to better support improvement to 
satisfactory standards and increase the quality of audit evidence to enable enforcement adjudicators to 
take swift action for CRCFs unwilling or incapable of meeting standards.  
Recommendation #1b:  DHEC adjudicators should consider enforcement actions to protect vulnerable 
clients living in unsatisfactory conditions concurrently with, not at the conclusion of, CRCF 
administrative due process appeals. 
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Finding #2:  The CRCF Program oversight suffered from a lack of fixed accountability for results, as well as 
ineffective coordination among all stakeholders to bring their capabilities to bear to address recalcitrant CRCFs. 
Recommendation #2a:  The CRCF Program, DHEC, should consider taking full ownership of ensuring 
CRCFs provide satisfactory living conditions for clients, and build a capacity to address CRCFs 
systemically operating with unsatisfactory living conditions.   
Recommendation #2b:   The CRCF Program, DHEC, should develop a common operating strategy 
with all agency stakeholders to efficiently coordinate their respective needs, streamline their collective 
oversight, and be judicious in all agencies’ collective “footprint” at CRCFs that consumes valuable 
CRCF staff resources to meet the varied needs of many oversight agencies.  
Recommendation #2c:  The CRCF Program, DHEC, should consider how to integrate other agency 
stakeholders’ independent inspections into the proposed risk based approach for the mutual benefit of 
each agency and the overall protection of the most vulnerable CRCF clients.  
Finding #3:  Small CRCFs operated on thin profit margins when meeting state standards, which may impact 
their long-term economic viability, yet these needed Medicaid beds were likely not replaceable in low income 
and rural communities.    
Recommendation #3a:  The CRCF Program, DHEC, should consider rigorously capturing data from its 
root cause analyses in its intervention with “high risk” CRCFs to better understand the actual costs to 
operate a small CRCF dependent on Medicaid supplemental funding to assist OSS, SCDHHS, in its 
Medical supplemental rate setting, particularly for small CRCFs. 
Recommendation #3b:  The CRCF Program, DHEC, and OSS, SCDHHS, should consider coordinating 
communication methods to increase awareness among CRCFs to examine their Medicaid supplemental 
patients’ physical conditions and, if appropriate, apply for Optional Supplemental Care of Assisted 
Living Participants (OSCAP).  
Finding #4:  The many agencies involved with CRCF oversight, funding, and client placements inefficiently 
transmitted their records of oversight, incidents, and actions among themselves, which undermined the State’s 
overall ability to effectively regulate CRCFs.   
Recommendation #4:  The CRCF Program, DHEC, should consider placing its inspection data and 
relevant data from stakeholders on its Internet webpage, which would also benefit consumers with the 
transparency serving as a healthy quality motivator to the CRCF population.     
Finding #5:  Separating the licensing of CRCF Administrators from regulating CRCF facilities diluted the  
authority, responsibility, and accountability for the State to effectively regulate CRCFs, which currently has 
unaddressed “high risk” CRCFs with unsatisfactory living conditions impacting a vulnerable elderly and 
disabled population.   
Recommendation #5a:  The SC Long Term Health Care Administrators Board, LLR, should consider 
mitigating the fragmented oversight of the CRCF administrators and facilities by re-examining its 
disciplinary procedures that primarily rely on DHEC CRCF inspection reports inasmuch as the current 
process appears to add questionable value due to its redundancy to DHEC’s disciplinary process. 
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Recommendation #5b:  The SC Long Term Health Care Administrators Board, LLR, should consider 
mitigating the fragmented oversight of the CRCF administrators and facilities by examining all DHEC 
inspection reports associated with a CRCF administer when renewing an Administrator’s license given 
the professional implications of renewing Administrators demonstrating a repeat pattern of substantial 
non-compliance with DHEC CRCF inspection criteria. 
Recommendation #5c:  The SC Long Term Health Care Administrators Board, LLR, should consider 
reviewing the current active license for the former Administrator for Robin’s CRCF, due to the alleged 
conduct requiring DHEC to revoke Robin’s CRCF license, effective 1/11/2016.   
ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE:   
DHEC’s comments on report located at link:  http://oig.sc.gov/Documents/DHEC_CRCF_Program_Response.pdf.
18 
List of Appendices 
A. News Articles re Peachtree Manor CRCF
B. Bill of Rights for Residents of Long Term Care Facilities
C. DHEC Inspection Checklists
D. DHEC Enforcement Process
E. Chronology of 5 CRCFs’ Inspection and Enforcement Actions
APPENDIX   A 
WIS News 10 Investigation of Peachtree Manor Uncovers Disturbing Trend 
Posted June 20, 2007
WINNSBORO, SC (WIS) - WIS News 10 has revisited an assisted living center, nearly eight 
months after a patient was killed in its care. We uncovered documents that show residents 
swallowing razor blades, employers sleeping on the job - and that's not all.  
Outside Peachtree Manor - patients sit around on a warm day. But not nearly as serene earlier 
Monday - a resident at the assisted living home breaking a window, telling authorities she'd tried 
to leave because she wasn't being treated humanely by staff.  
"I've seen horrible conditions," says one woman who agreed to talk to us on the condition of 
anonymity. She's a trained health professional, who's been inside Peachtree, "It's cooler staying 
outside than inside. Um, they're not getting their medicines. They're not being fed properly. And 
when you walk in the door you smell urine and feces."  
That said, she isn't surprised patients are trying to escape. "I wouldn't even take my dog there." 
A WIS News 10 investigation uncovered more than 30 separate reports documenting patient 
complaints. Some walked away. Others, unsupervised, tried to kill themselves. Our source says, 
"I can understand that. When you walk in, they're begging you to take them home. They don't 
want to stay there."  
Dan contacted Peachtree's owner, David Donnelly Junior. He dodged us last year when a patient 
was hit by a truck - and killed - right outside the home.  
Monday, Donnelly talked to WIS on the phone. In response to allegations of neglect, Donnelly 
says, "I'm not addressing anything."  
WIS' Dan Tordjman then asked him to explain why his license was suspended by DHEC. He 
says the case against him is grounded in lies. He says, "Everyone is lying except me."  
"It is a frightening situation," says Fairfield County Sheriff Herman Young - after Dan told him 
Peachtree's license was suspended. When Young took a look at the documents we found, the 
sheriff tells WIS News 10 he's contacting DHEC. "My concern about Peachtree Manor is the 
number of incident reports and the calls that we've had to make out there. Something is wrong." 
Dan first began investigating Peachtree Manor last year. The facility has only been open since 
early last year. Between that time and the fatal accident involving that patient, we found that 
Peachtree had been fined more than $20,000 by DHEC for various violations, from untrained 
staff to issuing bad checks to employees.  
WIS News 10 found that Peachtree appealed and never paid for any of it. But since then there 
are more accusations, a former employee saying what incident reports document - accusations of 
patient on patient rape, staff members asleep on the job, resident with access to razor-blades - 
swallowing the blades, in attempts to kill themselves. Many of the reports simply involve 
patients walking away from the facility.  
A DHEC spokesperson says the facility's license is indeed revoked, but that ruling is under 
appeal. So Peachtree it allowed to operate until a court hears the case.  
That hearing is scheduled for next week. 
Reported by Dan Tordjman 
Posted by Chantelle Janelle 
WIS News 10 Investigation of Peachtree Manor Continues
Posted June 25, 2007
WINNSBORO, SC (WIS) - Peachtree Manor in Winnsboro is a place with so many violations, 
the Department of Health and Environmental Control yanked it's permit to run eight months ago. 
Since then, the sheriff's department has responded to the facility dozens of times. There have 
been reports of residents swallowing razor blades, and staff asleep leaving residents 
unsupervised.  
So what's really going on at Peachtree Manor Residential Living Facility in Winnsboro, and why 
is the place still in business? 
Mary, who lives at Peachtree Manor, says she's one of the caregivers. 
"I'm 65 years old, and I feel that I treat them like I wanted to be treated. I think Mr. Donnelly's 
doing the best that he can," Mary told WIS News 10. 
Before we could talk to anyone else, a woman kicked us off the property. She said the owner, 
David Donnelly Jr., told her to. 
"He does not want you on his property," the woman told the reporter. 
When we started to leave, however, some residents followed. They said they wanted to be heard, 
like Rhoda. 
"I'm Type II diabetic, and they won't get me to the doctor," Rhoda said. 
While Rhoda told us her story, the woman who told us to leave made a lady with a walker turn 
around so she couldn't speak to us.  
And while Charlene told us she was afraid she was going to get in trouble, she told us, "I do 
believe there are things that need to be changed around here and I think I would be amiss if I 
didn't speak up for the rest of the folks here." 
Then there was another woman who disagreed. "Everybody's taken good care of in there. And if 
there wasn't I'd be the first to say it," she said. 
WIS News 10 started investigating Peachtree Manor back in October, after a patient was hit by a 
truck and killed right outside the home.  
Since then, we've obtained dozens of reports filed with the Fairfield County Sheriff's 
Department. 
Reports show two different residents swallowed razor blades, and both said they wanted to kill 
themselves.  
The first was in January, the second in April. On March 7, when deputies responded to a 
resident calling because he couldn't find his room, they say they arrived to find all the doors 
locked, and Peachtree employees asleep in the TV room.  
Then there are the DHEC reports. In May and June of last year, Peachtree Manor was cited for 
not running background checks on a number of its employees.  
Staff members had not been trained in first aid, were not trained in medication management, and 
some had no restraint training.  
The list goes on and on. 
There were so many penalties, the Department of Health and Environmental Control slapped the 
facility with over $20,000 in fines.  
In October DHEC revoked Peachtree Manor's operating permit. So why is the place still open? 
"It's the law. It's the right of a property owner," said DHEC spokesman Thom Berry.  
He says state law allows facilities like Peachtree to operate with no permit until the appeals 
process is through.  
It's a process that could go all the way to the Supreme Court, a process that could take years to 
resolve.  
That leaves residents like Rhoda to fend for themselves. 
Rhoda told WIS News 10 she has no family in the area to check up on her, and is basically on 
her own. 
Since WIS News 10 began investigating this story, we've learned Peachtree isn't the only facility 
that Mr. Donnelly owns.  
David Donnelly, Jr. also owns an assisted residential living facility called Myrtlecrest Residential 
Care Home, located in Eastover, which is outside of Sumter.  
DHEC says so far this year that facility has only been cited once for a minor infraction. 
Last year, however, Myrtlecrest had 11 citations. In 2005 it had six. 
You can count on WIS News 10 to continue to follow this story. 
Reported by Kara Gormley 
Posted by Logan Smith 
APPENDIX   B 
South Carolina Code of Laws 
Unannotated 
Current through the end of the 2014 Session 
Title 44 - Health 
CHAPTER 81 
 
SECTION 44-81-10.  Bill of Rights for Residents of Long-Term Care Facilities  
  
HISTORY: 1985 Act No. 118, Section 1. 
 
SECTION 44-81-20. Legislative findings. 
 
The General Assembly finds that persons residing within long-term care facilities are isolated from 
the community and often lack the means to assert their rights fully as individual citizens. The 
General Assembly recognizes the need for these persons to live within the least restrictive 
environment possible in order to retain their individuality and personal freedom. The General 
Assembly further finds that it is necessary to preserve the dignity and personal integrity of residents 
of long-term care facilities through the recognition and declaration of rights safeguarding against 
encroachments upon each resident's need for self-determination. 
 
HISTORY: 1985 Act No. 118, Section 2. 
 
SECTION 44-81-30. Definitions. 
 
As used in this chapter: 
 
(1) "Long-term care facility" means an intermediate care facility, nursing care facility, or residential 
care facility subject to regulation and licensure by the State Department of Health and 
Environmental Control (department). 
 
(2) "Resident" means a person who is receiving treatment or care in a long-term care facility. 
 
(3) "Representative" means a resident's legal guardian, committee, or next of kin or other person 
acting as agent of a resident who does not have a legally appointed guardian. 
 
HISTORY: 1985 Act No. 118, Section 3. 
 
SECTION 44-81-40. Rights of residents; written and oral explanation required. 
 
(A) Each resident or the resident's representative must be given by the facility a written and oral 
explanation of the rights, grievance procedures, and enforcement provisions of this chapter before 
or at the time of admission to a long-term care facility. Written acknowledgment of the receipt of 
the explanation by the resident or the resident's representative must be made a part of the resident's 
file. Each facility must have posted written notices of the residents' rights in conspicuous locations 
in the facility. The written notices must be approved by the department. The notices must be in a 
type and a format which is easily readable by residents and must describe residents' rights, 
grievance procedures, and the enforcement provisions provided by this chapter. 
 
 
(B) Each resident and the resident's representative must be informed in writing, before or at the time 
of admission, of: 
 
(1) available services and of related charges, including all charges not covered under federal or state 
programs, by other third party payers, or by the facility's basic per diem rate; 
 
(2) the facility's refund policy which must be adopted by each facility and which must be based 
upon the actual number of days a resident was in the facility and any reasonable number of bed-hold 
days, except when the provisions of subsection (E) apply. 
 
Each resident and the resident's representative must be informed in writing of any subsequent 
change in services, charges, or refund policy. 
 
(C) Each resident or the resident's legal guardian has the right to: 
 
(1) choose a personal attending physician; 
(2) participate in planning care and treatment or changes in care and treatment; 
(3) be fully informed in advance about changes in care and treatment that may affect the resident's 
well-being; 
(4) receive from the resident's physician a complete and current description of the resident's 
diagnosis and prognosis in terms that the resident is able to understand; 
(5) refuse to participate in experimental research. 
 
(D) A resident may be transferred or discharged only for medical reasons, for the welfare of the 
resident or for the welfare of other residents of the facility, or for nonpayment and must be given 
written notice of not less than thirty days, except that when the health, safety, or welfare of other 
residents of the facility would be endangered by the thirty-day notice requirement, the time for 
giving notice must be that which is practicable under the circumstances. Each resident must be 
given written notice before the resident's room or roommate in the facility is changed. 
 
(E)(1) If a community residential care facility resident or a resident's representative chooses to 
voluntarily relocate from the resident's current facility, the resident or the resident's representative 
must give the facility administrator written notice of this intent to relocate not less than fourteen 
days before the resident's relocation becomes effective. Voluntary relocation does not occur when a 
resident of a community residential care facility seeks to be discharged because a higher level of 
care is required or because the resident's health, safety, or welfare is endangered. 
 
(2) If a community residential care facility resident or a resident's representative fails to give timely 
notice as required by this subsection, the facility administrator may charge the resident the 
equivalent of fourteen days occupancy from the earlier of the date of the relocation or the date the 
facility administrator received proper notice of the resident's intent to relocate. However, if the 
facility is able to fill the bed vacated by the resident, the facility shall cease charging the resident 
regardless of the notice given. The facility shall notify the previous resident in writing as soon as it 
fills the bed with a new resident. 
 
(3) Residents participating in the Optional State Supplementation Program are excluded from the 
requirements of items (1) and (2). 
 
(F) Each resident or the resident's representative may manage the resident's personal finances unless 
the facility has been delegated in writing to carry out this responsibility, in which case the resident 
must be given a quarterly report of the resident's account. 
 (G) Each resident must be free from mental and physical abuse and free from chemical and physical 
restraints except those restraints ordered by a physician. 
 
(H) Each resident must be assured security in storing personal possessions and confidential 
treatment of the resident's personal and medical records and may approve or refuse their release to 
any individual outside the facility, except in the case of a transfer to another health care institution 
or as required by law or a third party payment contract. 
 
(I) Each resident must be treated with respect and dignity and assured privacy during treatment and 
when receiving personal care. 
 
(J) Each resident must be assured that no resident will be required to perform services for the 
facility that are not for therapeutic purposes as identified in the plan of care for the resident. 
 
(K) The legal guardian, family members, and other relatives of each resident must be allowed 
immediate access to that resident, subject to the resident's right to deny access or withdraw consent 
to access at any time. Each resident without unreasonable delay or restrictions must be allowed to 
associate and communicate privately with persons of the resident's choice and must be assured 
freedom and privacy in sending and receiving mail. The legal guardian, family members, and other 
relatives of each resident must be allowed to meet in the facility with the legal guardian, family 
members, and other relatives of other residents to discuss matters related to the facility, so long as 
the meeting does not disrupt resident care or safety. 
 
(L) Each resident may meet with and participate in activities of social, religious, and community 
groups at the resident's discretion unless medically contraindicated by written medical order. 
 
(M) Each resident must be able to keep and use personal clothing and possessions as space permits 
unless it infringes on another resident's rights. 
 
(N) Each resident must be assured privacy for visits of a conjugal nature. 
 
(O) Married residents must be permitted to share a room unless medically contraindicated by the 
attending physician in the medical record. 
 
(P) A resident or a resident's legal representative may contract with a person not associated with or 
employed by the facility to perform sitter services unless the services are prohibited from being 
performed by a private contractor by state or federal law or by the written contract between the 
facility and the resident. The person, being a private contractor, is required to abide by and follow 
the policies and procedures of the facility as they pertain to sitters and volunteers. The person must 
be selected from an approved list or agency and approved by the facility. All residents or residents' 
legal representatives employing a private contractor must agree in writing to hold the facility 
harmless from any liability. 
 
HISTORY: 1985 Act No. 118, Section 4; 1992 Act No. 474, Section 1; 1994 Act No. 438, Section 
1; 2014 Act No. 170 (H.3098), Section 1, eff May 16, 2014. 
 
SECTION 44-81-50. Discrimination. 
 
Each resident must be offered treatment without discrimination as to sex, race, color, religion, 
national origin, or source of payment. 
 HISTORY: 1985 Act No. 118, Section 5. 
 
SECTION 44-81-60. Grievance procedures; review by department. 
 
Each facility shall establish grievance procedures to be exercised by or on behalf of the resident to 
enforce the rights provided by this act. The department shall review and approve these grievance 
procedures annually. This act is enforced by the department. The department may promulgate 
regulations to carry out the provisions of this act. 
 
HISTORY: 1985 Act No. 118, Section 6. 
 
SECTION 44-81-70. Retaliation. 
 
No facility by or through its owner, administrator, or operator, or any person subject to the 
supervision, direction, or control of the owner, administrator, or operator shall retaliate against a 
resident after the resident or the resident’s legal representative has engaged in exercising rights 
under this act by increasing charges, decreasing services, rights, or privileges, or by taking any 
action to coerce or compel the resident to leave the facility or by abusing or embarrassing or 
threatening any resident in any manner. 
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BHFL-14 Consent Order Enforcement Action Standard Operating Procedure (CC<ia:ndl:IFO} 
Puwose 
To define the process to be followed when an inspection, investigation, or failure 
regulatory requirements results in a Consent Order being generated with a 
or permitted by BHFL. 
Key Staff Involved 
to comply with 
facility licensed 
Field Manager, Division Director, Assurance Coordinator, Policy & Development staff, Bureau 
Chief, Deputy Director, Legal 
Process Steps 
1. When violations are identified that could require an Enforcement Action against a facility, the
Field Manager completes the Enforcement Action Request Form (SEE FIGURE 1.0) and submits
it to the Division Director.
2. Division Director reviews the request and, if an enforcement action is recommended, forwards
the form to the Assurance Coordinator.
3. Assurance Coordinator creates a packet including the Summary of Violations Fonn (SEE
FIGURE 2.0), which shows the past 36 months of compliance history for the
facility, and Proposed Enforcement Action Memorandum (SEE FIGURE 3.0).
4. The packet is reviewed and signed off on by the Field Manager, Division Director, Bureau Chief,
and the Deputy Director.
5. Assurance Coordinator creates a letter inf orrning the facility that it has been determined to be in
violation of certain standards and BHFL is considering an enforcement action against
the facility. The letter includes a synopsis of the violations. It also invites the facility to attend
an Enforcement Conference to discuss the violations. The letter is sent by Certified Mail.
6. The Enforcement Conference is typically held within 3-4 weeks, or earlier if necessary, and is
attended by the Division Director, Bureau Chief, Policy and Development staff
and DHEC Legal.
7. The cited violations are reviewed with the facility, with the intent of agreeing to a Consent Order.
The Consent Order spells out the actions the facility will take to bring itself into compliance.
8. If the parties are unable to reach agreement on a Consent Order, BHFL may seek an
Ac4:ninistrative Order against the facility (SEE BHFL-15).
9. If the parties agree to a Consent Order, the Bureau Chief and the facility sign an Enforcement
Conference Summary & Agreement Sheet, which stipulates the pertinent terms agreed upon (SEE
FIGURE 4.0).
IO. Assurance Coordinator drafts a proposed Consent Order and submits to Legal for review.
11. Assurance Coordinator sends the proposed Consent Order to the facility by Certified Mail.
12. The Consent Order must be signed by both the licensee and the administrator of the facility (if
they are 2 different individuals) and returned to BHFL within 15 days. Failure to timely return
the Consent Order may result in BHFL seeking an Administrative Order against the facility (SEE
BHFL-15).
13. Once the· signed Consent Order is returned, it is signed by Legal, the Bureau Chief and the
Director of Public Health.
14. Assurance Coordinator sends a copy of the executed Consent Order to the facility by Certified
Mail.
15. Assurance Coordinator makes an electronic copy on the T:\ drive and a paper copy for the
Enforcement file.














APPENDIX E 
 CRCF #1 (4 - 9 beds) 
 DHEC Inspections/Investigations/Enforcement Actions & LLR Enforcement Actions Initiated 
 5/20/2011
 1/4/2012
 1/6/2012
 6/1/2012
 2/5/2013
 6/7/2013
 10/22/2013
 12/20/2013
 1/16/2014
 6/20/2014
 6/24/2014
 7/7/2014
 2/17/2015
 6/26/2015
 6/26/2015
 10/2/2015
Inspection – 21 Total violations; 9 Class I & 12 Class II violations 
Inspection – 31 Total violations; 10 Class I & 21 Class II violations; 25 Repeat violations 
Inspection – 2 Total violations; 2 Class II violations; 2 Repeat violations 
Inspection – 61 Total violations; 20 Class I violations; 41 Class II violations; 61 Repeat violations 
DHEC Executed a Consent Order based on the 4 previous inspections requiring a $21,500 
monetary penalty/$4,800 payable in 12 months/1 Yr period of substantial compliance of 
Regulations 61- 84/$16,700 kept in abeyance 
Inspection - 28 Total violations; 10 Class I violations; 18 Class II violations; 17 Repeat  
violations  
Inspection & Follow-up Investigation – 15 Total violations; 2 Class I violations; 13 Class II  
violations; 11 Repeat violations 
Inspection – 22 Total violations; 11 Class I violations; 11 Class II violations; 10 Repeat  
violations 
Inspection – 11 Total violations; 5 Class I violations; 6 Class II violations; 3 Repeat violations 
Inspection & Complaint Investigations– 28 Total violations; 16 Class I violations; 12 Class II 
violations; 13 Repeat violations  
Inspection – 16 Total violations; 10 Class I violations; 6 Class II violations 
DHEC executed letter to acknowledge receipt of final payment of $4,800 penalty/ considered 
the facility to be in substantial compliance of the regulations and the matter closed. 
LLR Executed Consent Order based on DHEC 2/5/13 Consent Order – License suspended/ 
stayed; 2 Yrs Probation & $2,000 fine paid within 90 days 
Inspection – 17 Total violations; 14 Class I violations; 3 Class II violations 
Inspection – 5 Total violations; 5 Class II violations 
Inspection – 33 Total violations; 29 Class I violations; 4 Class II violations; 19 Repeat  
violations. 
Total 
Violations Class I Class II 
Repeat 
Violations 
290 136 154 161 

CRCF # 3 (10-50 beds} 
DHEC Inspections/Investigations/Enforcement Actions & LLR Enforcement Actions Initiated 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
5/24/2012 
11/8/2012 
5/15/2013 
12/13/2013 
7/2/2014 
7/23/2014 
8/5/2014 
9/2/2014 
9/3/2014 
4/8/2015 
9/3/2015 
7/1/2015 
7/24/2015 
Total 
Violations 
108 
Inspection & Complaint Investigation - 24 Total violations; 15 Class I violations; 9 Class II 
violations; 20 Repeat violations 
Inspection - 15 Total violations; 8 Class I violations; 7 Class II violations; 12 Repeat violations 
Inspection - 17 Total violations; 6 Class I violations; 11 Class II violations; 15 Repeat 
violations Complaint Investigation - 2 Total violations; 2 Class I violations; 2 Repeat violations 
LLR executed an Order to Cease and Desist - License expired 6/30/14 ($50 Late Fee Penalty) 
DHEC executed a Consent Order based on the previous 4 DHEC inspections ($5,500 monetary 
penalty/$500 payment within 30 days/remainder kept in abeyance) 
LLR executed an Order to Cease and Desist - Second Notice - License expired 6/30/14 
($50 Late Fee Penalty) 
LLR executed an Order to Cease and Desist - Final Notice - License expired 6/30/14 
($25 Late Fee Penalty) 
Complaint Investigation - 28 Total violations; 22 Class I violations; 6 Class II violations; 
8 Repeat violations 
CRCF Administrator's License renewed 4/8/2015. The facility operated without a licensed 
Administrator for nearly a year (10 months) 
LLR Executed Consent Order - 1 Year Probationary status & $3,356.80 fine due within 90 days 
Inspection - 22 Total violations; 13 Class I violations; 9 Class II violations; 9 Repeat violations 
DHEC executes letter to acknowledge receipt of final payment of $500 penalty/$5,000 held in 
abeyance/considered the facility to be in substantial compliance with Regulation 61-84 and 
the matter closed. 
Class I Class II 
66 42 
Repeat 
Violations 
66 
CRCF #4 (4 - 9 beds) 
DHEC Inspections/Investigations/Enforcement Actions & LLR Enforcement Actions Initiated 
• 12/16/2010
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
5/11/2012 
12/19/2012 
6/5/2013 
10/31/2013 
3/27/2014 
4/24/2014 
5/1/2014 
6/25/2014 
8/20/2014 
11/21/2014 
7/9/2015 
10/20/2015 
2/4/2015 
2/26/2015 
5/26/2015 
Total 
LLR executed a Consent Order - Administrator cited for operating an unlicensed CRCF (1 Year 
Probationary status & $100 fine for each day that the facility operated as an unlicensed CRCF 
for a total fine of $100 - w/in 30 days. 
Inspection - 10 Total violations; 7 Class I violations; 2 Class II violations 
Inspection - 4 Total violations; 4 Class I violations 
Inspection - 17 Total violations; 9 Class I violations; 8 Class II violations; 10 Repeat violations 
Complaint Investigation - 1 Total violation; 1 Class I violation; 1 Repeat violation 
Complaint Investigation - 3 Total violations; 3 Class I violations 
DHEC executed an Administrative Order - CRCF Owner fined $5,000 for operating an 
unlicensed CRCF. 
DHEC executed a Consent Order based on the previous 3 inspections requiring a $10,000 
monetary penalty/$3,600 payable within 12 month ($300 monthly)/$6,400 kept in abeyance. 
Inspection & Complaint Investigation - 56 Total violations; 51 Class I violations; 5 Class II 
violations; 31 Repeat violations 
Inspection - 33 Total violations; 28 Class I violations; 5 Class II violations; 29 Repeat 
Complaint Investigation - 5 Total violations; 5 Class I violations; 3 Repeat violations 
Inspection & Complaint Investigation - 34 Total violations; 33 Class I violations; 1 Class II 
violation; 13 Repeat violations 
Inspection & Complaint Investigation - 22 Total violations; 19 Class I violations; 3 Class II 
violations; 17 Repeat violations 
DHEC initiated a Call-in Penalty of $8,800 within 30 days due to repeated violations, failure to 
pay fine as specified in the 5/1/14 Consent Order and operation of an unlicensed CRCF. DHEC 
established a payment acknowledgement/agreement upon the Administrator's request to 
make the final payment by 5/26/15. 
Final penalty ($8,800) payment received by DHEC in accordance with the agreement. 
However, the CRCF has not paid the penalty ($5,000) assessment pursuant to the 
Administrative Order executed 4/24/2014 for operating an unlicensed facility. 
Repeat 
Violations Class I Class II Violations 
185 160 25 104 
 CRCF # 5 (10-50 beds) 
 DHEC Inspections/Investigations/Enforcement Actions & LLR Enforcement Actions Initiated 
 1/29/2010 Inspection & Complaint Investigation – 9 Total violations;  9 Class I violations 
 4/8/2010 Inspection – 15 Total violations; 15 Class I violations  
 6/1/2010 DHEC Imposed a Monetary Penalty based on the inspections above ($4,200 monetary penalty) 
 12/22/2010 Administrative Law Court Consent Order assessed a civil penalty of $4,200, of which $2,700 
was suspended (required to pay $1,500 - $300 monthly installments w/in 150 days 
 5/18/2011 DHEC Letter to acknowledge receipt of final payment of $1,500 penalty/$2,700 suspended 
with execution of the Consent Order and the facility considered to be operating in substantial 
compliance of the regulations and the matter closed.  
 12/1/2011 LLR Executed Amended Consent Agreement - Fined $1,411.50/Probationary status for 1 Yr 
 5/31/2012 Inspection & Complaint Investigation– 17 Total violations; 3 Class I violations; 14 Class II  
violations  
 9/27/2012 Inspection – 22 Total violations; 2 Class I violations;  20 Class II violations 
 12/13/2012 Inspection & Complaint Investigation – 18 Total violations; 9 Class I violations; 9 Class II  
violations; 15 Repeat violations 
 5/7/2013 Inspection & Complaint Investigation – 8 Total violations; 5 Class I violations; 3 Class II  
violations; 3 Repeat violations 
 9/26/2013 Inspection – 29 Total violations; 23 Class I violations; 6 Class II violations; 16 Repeat violations 
 2/28/2014 Inspection – 30 Total violations; 9 Class I violations; 21 Class II violations; 19 Repeat violations 
 9/11/2014 DHEC executed Consent Order based on the previous six inspections ($20,000 monetary  
penalty/$6,000 payment within 12 month installments/$14,000 kept in abeyance) 
 11/24/2014 Inspection & Complaint Investigation – 24 Total violations; 10 Class I violations; 14 Class II 
violations; 16 Repeat violations 
 1/2/2015 LLR executed a Consent Agreement - Fined $600/Probationary status for 1 Yr 
 2/25/2015 Inspection – 12 Total violations; 7 Class I violations; 5 Class II violations 
 6/11/2015 LLR executed a Consent Agreement - Fined $2,100/Probationary status for 1 Yr 
 8/21/2015 Inspection & Complaint Investigation – 17 Total violations; 10 Class I violations; 7 Class II 
violations; 3 Repeat violations 
 9/24/2015 DHEC Letter to acknowledge receipt of final payment of $6,000 penalty/$14,000 held in  
abeyance and the facility considered to be operating in substantial compliance of the  
regulations and the matter closed.  
Total 
Violations Class I Class II 
Repeat 
Violations 
201 102 99 72 
